一、指导案例74号：中国平安财产保险股份有限公司江苏分公司诉江苏镇江安装集团有限公司保险人代位求偿权纠纷案

案例名称/出处

指导案例74号：中国平安财产保险股份有限公司江苏分公司诉江苏镇江安装集团有限公司保险人代位求偿权纠纷案。最高人民法院审判委员会讨论通过，2016年12月28日发布，属保险法/财产保险领域代表性指导性案例。

一审：江苏省镇江市京口区人民法院（2010）京商初字第1822号；二审：江苏省镇江市中级人民法院（2011）镇商终字第0133号；再审：江苏省高级人民法院（2012）苏商再提字第0035号。

基本案情

发包人华东联合制罐有限公司、华东联合制罐第二有限公司与承包人江苏镇江安装集团有限公司签订建设工程施工合同，由承包人负责发包人整厂机器设备的迁建安装工作。合同约定承包人不得将工程分包，但分包单位的任何违约行为或疏忽导致工程损害的，承包人仍须承担连带责任；关于保险事项，合同约定运至施工场地待安装的设备由发包人办理保险并支付保费。发包人据此向中国平安财产保险股份有限公司江苏分公司投保了安装工程一切险（并附加"内陆运输扩展条款A"），投保单明确记载承包人镇江安装公司不是被保险人。

承包人违反合同约定，将设备吊装运输工作分包给镇江亚民大件起重有限公司。该公司司机驾驶重型半挂车运输彩印机途中，因转弯时钢丝绳断裂，致使彩印机侧翻滑落损坏，镇江市交警部门认定司机负事故全部责任。平安财险公司理赔后，发包人出具权益转让书，将相应保险标的权益转让给平安财险公司，平安财险公司遂以保险人代位求偿权为由，诉请镇江安装公司赔偿相应损失及公估费用。

争议焦点

本案历经一审支持保险公司诉请、二审改判驳回、再审又改判支持的反复，争议焦点集中为两点：（一）保险代位求偿权的适用范围是否仅限于第三者对保险标的的侵权损害赔偿请求权，抑或也涵盖因第三者违约行为造成保险标的损害的情形；（二）承包人能否以其对保险标的也享有保险利益、且发包人已就该标的投保财产损失保险为由，主张免除自己对发包人的违约赔偿责任，进而阻却保险人行使代位求偿权。

裁判理由与结果

最高人民法院通过再审程序确立的规则认为：《中华人民共和国保险法》第60条第1款所称"因第三者对保险标的的损害而造成保险事故"，其文义并未限定为侵权损害，因第三者违约行为造成保险标的损害同样属于该条情形；保险人依法赔偿被保险人后，有权在赔偿金额范围内代位行使被保险人对该违约第三者的损害赔偿请求权，不受限于侵权请求权范围。

裁判理由同时区分了"所有权保险利益"与"责任保险利益"：发包人作为保险标的所有权人投保的安装工程一切险，保障的是其基于所有权产生的保险利益，性质上属于财产损失保险；承包人作为施工过程中可能对保险标的造成损害的责任主体，对该标的仅享有责任保险利益——承包人若欲将其可能产生的赔偿责任转移给保险人承担，应当另行投保相应的责任保险，不能以发包人已投保财产损失保险为由，主张免除自己依建设工程施工合同对发包人应承担的违约赔偿责任。此外，合同已明确约定分包不解除承包人责任，分包单位的违约或疏忽行为造成的损害仍由承包人承担连带赔偿责任。据此，法院最终判决镇江安装公司向平安财险公司支付相应赔偿款。

法律意义与延伸思考

本案的核心贡献在于将保险代位求偿权的请求权基础由"侵权"扩张至"违约"，厘清了《保险法》第60条文义与保险代位求偿制度目的——避免被保险人获得双重赔偿、确保损害赔偿责任最终归属于真正的责任方——之间的关系，统一了此前各级法院在该问题上的裁判分歧，这也正是本案历经一审、二审、再审反复改判才最终入选指导性案例的直接原因。本案同时确立了财产保险与责任保险中"保险利益"类型化的分析框架，对此后建设工程、货物运输等多方主体、多重保险并存情形下保险人代位求偿权的行使边界具有重要参照价值。

从比较法视角看，英美法系的保险代位求偿（subrogation）制度同样不以侵权为限，而是着眼于防止被保险人双重受偿、并维持最终责任由过错方（无论基于侵权还是违约）承担的政策目标，这与本案所确立的规则在法理基础上高度相通，可资比较研究。对于从事涉外保险、国际货物运输保险及跨境工程承包法律事务的从业者而言，本案也提示：在中国法下，保险人代位求偿权可触及的责任类型范围较为宽泛，并不因责任基础是合同违约而受到限制，这一点在处理涉外工程保险、物流保险纠纷时具有直接的实务指导意义。

二、指导案例171号：中天建设集团有限公司诉河南恒和置业有限公司建设工程施工合同纠纷案

案例名称/出处

指导案例171号：中天建设集团有限公司诉河南恒和置业有限公司建设工程施工合同纠纷案。最高人民法院审判委员会讨论通过，2021年11月9日发布，属建设工程施工合同法（合同法分则）及建设工程价款优先受偿权制度的代表性指导性案例。

一审：河南省高级人民法院（2018）豫民初3号；二审：最高人民法院（2019）最高法民终255号。

基本案情

2012年至2013年间，河南恒和置业有限公司（发包人）与中天建设集团有限公司（承包人）两次签订《建设工程施工合同》，由承包人承建位于洛阳市的"恒和国际商务会展中心"工程，合同对工期、工程价款及违约责任等事项作出约定。合同签订后承包人即进场施工，但施工期间发包人长期拖欠工程款，承包人多次（2013年、2014年）向发包人发函催讨未果，工程最终于2015年2月5日停工，彼时承包人已完成产值2.87亿余元。

2014年4月至11月间，双方共同委托第三方造价咨询机构对工程进行结算审核并出具审核报告，双方均盖章确认审核结果。2014年11月，河南省焦作市中级人民法院依发包人其他债权人的申请，启动对案涉在建工程的强制拍卖程序；承包人随即向该执行法院提交联系函，主张其对工程享有建设工程价款优先受偿权并请求参与拍卖分配。此后承包人又多次向发包人及相关法院发函、提交申请书，重申该主张。直至2018年1月，承包人才正式向河南省高级人民法院提起诉讼，请求解除合同并确认发包人欠付的工程款及其优先受偿权。发包人则以承包人提起诉讼主张优先受偿权的时间已超过司法解释规定的6个月除斥期间为由进行抗辩。

争议焦点

根据相关司法解释，承包人行使建设工程价款优先受偿权的期限为六个月除斥期间，自发包人应当给付工程价款之日起算。本案的争议焦点是：承包人若仅在强制执行程序中以向执行法院提交函件等非诉讼方式主张优先受偿权，而迟至数年后才正式提起确权诉讼，该诉讼请求是否因超过除斥期间而丧失优先受偿权？换言之，"行使"优先受偿权是否必须以诉讼方式、并在除斥期间内完成，还是说非诉讼的主张方式同样可以产生阻却除斥期间经过的法律效果？

裁判理由与结果

最高人民法院认为，建设工程价款优先受偿权制度旨在保护承包人（往往牵涉建筑工人工资发放这一链条）的合法权益，其效力依司法解释优先于建设工程上设立的抵押权以及发包人其他债权人所享有的普通债权。当执行法院依其他债权人的申请对发包人的建设工程采取强制执行措施时，必然会影响承包人优先受偿权的实现；此时承包人向执行法院主张其对建设工程享有优先受偿权，本身即属于行使该权利的合法方式，并不以提起诉讼为唯一途径。

本案中，承包人在工程被申请强制拍卖之初即向执行法院提交函件主张优先受偿权，此后又持续通过函件、工作联系单、参与分配申请书等方式向发包人及有关法院重申该主张，足以证明其已在除斥期间内行使了建设工程价款优先受偿权；其后于2018年提起的确权诉讼，只是对既已行使、持续存续的权利予以司法确认，并非权利行使行为本身，不应因该诉讼提起的时间晚于除斥期间而否定其已经依法行使的优先受偿权。据此，最高人民法院二审判决驳回发包人上诉，维持一审判决确认的工程欠款数额及承包人的优先受偿权。

法律意义与延伸思考

本案的规则意义在于将建设工程价款优先受偿权"除斥期间"的起算与权利"行使方式"作出实质区分：除斥期间约束的是权利人主张权利的时点，而非要求必须采用诉讼这一特定形式——只要承包人在除斥期间内以足够明确的方式（包括向执行法院提交函件）向义务人或有权机关表达了行使优先受偿权的意思，即已完成"行使"，后续提起的诉讼仅具有权利确认的程序意义。该规则有效缓解了建筑工程实务中承包人因发包人资金链断裂、工程被第三方债权人申请强制执行而被迫同时面对"执行程序时限"与"除斥期间"双重压力的困境，对于保护承包人及其背后建筑工人的合法权益、防止发包人及其他债权人借助除斥期间制度规则空转优先受偿权，具有重要的政策导向意义。

本案可与此前已推送的指导性案例250号（利辛县某达融资担保公司诉某安建设公司等第三人撤销之诉案，涉及建设工程价款优先受偿权与保证人代偿后追偿权的竟合问题）构成建设工程价款优先受偿权主题下的姊妹案例：250号聚焦优先受偿权与第三人担保利益的冲突协调，171号则聚焦优先受偿权行使方式与除斥期间的认定标准，两案从不同角度共同塑造了中国建设工程价款优先受偿权制度在司法实践中的具体适用边界，而非简单重复。对于涉外工程承包（例如中国企业承揽"一带一路"沿线国家的工程项目，或外国企业在华承包工程）而言，工程价款优先受偿权与强制执行程序、破产程序的交叉适用同样是实务中高发的争议类型，本案提供的"非诉主张即视为行使"的宽松认定标准，值得在处理类似涉外工程款纠纷时参考援用。

III. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916)

Case Name and Citation

MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), Court of Appeals of New York (New York's highest court). Argued January 24, 1916; decided March 14, 1916. Opinion by Cardozo, J., joined by Hiscock, Chase and Cuddeback, JJ.; Hogan, J., concurring in the result; Willard Bartlett, Ch. J., dissenting; Pound, J., not voting.

Facts

The defendant, Buick Motor Company, manufactured automobiles and sold a finished car to an independent retail dealer, who in turn resold it to the plaintiff, Donald C. MacPherson. One of the car's wooden wheels, although installed by Buick, had actually been manufactured by a separate parts supplier rather than by Buick itself. While MacPherson was driving, the wheel suddenly collapsed because its spokes were made of defective wood; he was thrown from the vehicle and seriously injured. The evidence showed that the defect could have been discovered through reasonable inspection, but Buick had not inspected the wheel before assembling and selling the finished automobile. There was no allegation that Buick had actual knowledge of this particular defect and concealed it. Because MacPherson had bought the car from the independent dealer rather than directly from Buick, there was no contractual relationship — no "privity of contract" — between him and the manufacturer.

Issue

Under the privity doctrine that then generally governed manufacturer liability (traceable to the English case Winterbottom v. Wright (1842)), a manufacturer owed a duty of care in negligence only to the party with whom it had directly contracted, which ordinarily shielded manufacturers from liability to remote purchasers who had no contract with them. A narrow exception had developed for products that were "inherently dangerous" by their very nature — poisons, explosives, firearms — where liability could extend to the ultimate user regardless of privity. The question before the court was whether an automobile, which is not inherently dangerous in the way a poison is, but which can certainly cause serious injury if negligently manufactured, fell within — or justified judicially extending — that exception, so that Buick could be held liable in negligence to MacPherson despite the complete absence of any contractual relationship between them.

Holding, Reasoning, and Result

Writing for the majority, Judge Cardozo held that Buick could indeed be liable to MacPherson notwithstanding the lack of privity. He built on the earlier New York precedent Thomas v. Winchester (1852), in which a mislabeled poison was held to create liability running beyond the immediate purchaser because the product's danger to life was foreseeable. Cardozo rejected the view that this principle was confined to a fixed, closed list of "inherently dangerous" items such as poisons and explosives. Instead, he restated the test functionally and prospectively: "If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be expected." Where that element of foreseeable danger is combined with the manufacturer's knowledge that the finished product will be used by persons other than the immediate purchaser, without further inspection or testing by any intermediary, a duty of care independent of contract arises and runs to those ultimate users.

An automobile, Cardozo observed, plainly carries that kind of foreseeable danger if negligently constructed: "the nature of an automobile gives warning of probable danger if its construction is defective." Buick therefore owed a duty to inspect the finished product — including component parts, such as the wheel, that it had purchased from an outside supplier — before placing the car into the stream of commerce. Having failed to make a reasonable inspection, Buick could not escape liability simply because the specific defect originated with its parts supplier rather than with Buick's own manufacturing process; the court held that the manufacturer of the finished product bears responsibility for the safety of the assembled whole that it sells under its own name. On these grounds, the Court of Appeals affirmed judgment for MacPherson.

Chief Judge Bartlett dissented, arguing that the traditional privity rule — limited to the narrow inherently-dangerous-product exception — remained sound and administrable, and that if it were to be abandoned in favor of a broader, foreseeability-based duty for mass-produced goods such as automobiles, that policy change should properly come from the legislature rather than from judicial reinterpretation of precedent.

Significance and Further Reflection

MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. is one of the foundational cases of modern American tort and products-liability law. By dissolving the rigid privity requirement and replacing the narrow, closed "inherently dangerous" category with a general, foreseeability-based duty of care running from manufacturers to ultimate consumers, Cardozo's opinion supplied the doctrinal foundation on which later courts built true strict products liability, culminating decades later in cases such as Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (Cal. 1963) and in § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The case is frequently paired in American law-school casebooks with another Cardozo opinion from the same court roughly a decade later, Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. (N.Y. 1928): together the two cases trace the evolution of foreseeability as the organizing principle of negligence law — MacPherson expanding the class of people to whom a defendant's duty of care runs, and Palsgraf later limiting that same duty by the scope of foreseeable risk.

For a reader oriented toward comparative and cross-border legal practice, MacPherson also offers a useful point of comparison with civil-law systems. Jurisdictions such as China addressed the same underlying problem — the mismatch between contract-based (privity) liability and the realities of modern, multi-tiered chains of manufacture and distribution — primarily through statutory products-liability regimes (e.g., the Product Quality Law and the tort-liability provisions of the Civil Code) rather than through incremental case-by-case judicial reasoning. Setting MacPherson's common-law method — extending liability by analogy outward from a narrow historical exception — against the civil-law method of direct legislative design illustrates a recurring theme in comparative law: that functionally convergent substantive outcomes (holding manufacturers liable to remote end-users for negligent manufacture) can be reached through strikingly different institutional and methodological paths. The case also remains practically relevant today: questions about which jurisdiction's duty-of-care or privity rules govern multinational, multi-tier supply chains — much like Buick's reliance in 1916 on an outside wheel manufacturer — continue to recur in contemporary cross-border product-liability disputes.